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Abstract Increasing evidence suggests that the visual
analysis of other people’s actions depends upon the
observer’s own body representation or schema. This
raises the question of how diﬀerences in observers’ body
structure and schema impact their perception of human
movement. We investigated the visual experiences of two
persons born without arms, one with and the other
without phantom sensations. These participants, plus six
normally-limbed control observers, viewed depictions of
upper limb movement under conditions of apparent
motion. Consistent with previous results (Shiﬀrar M,
Freyd JJ (1990) Psychol Sci 1:257), normally-limbed
observers perceived rate-dependent paths of apparent
human movement. Speciﬁcally, biologically impossible
motion trajectories were reported at rapid display rates
while biologically possible trajectories were reported at
slow display rates. The aplasic individual with phantom
experiences showed the same perceptual pattern as
control participants, while the aplasic individual without
phantom sensations did not. These preliminary results
suggest that phantom experiences may constrain the
visual analysis of the human body. These results further
suggest that it may be time to move beyond the question
of whether aplasic phantoms exist and instead focus on
the question of why some people with limb aplasia
experience phantom sensations while others do not. In
this light, the current results suggest that somesthetic
representations are not suﬃcient to deﬁne body schema.
Instead, neural systems matching action observation,
action execution and motor imagery likely contribute to
the deﬁnition of body schema in profound ways. Addi-
tional research with aplasic individuals, having and
lacking phantom sensations, is needed to resolve this
issue.
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Introduction
Studies of phantom limbs after amputation have pro-
vided revolutionary insights into the neural plasticity of
the human brain (Ramachandran and Hirstein 1998;
Halligan 2002 for reviews). These studies have also re-
vealed that the ‘‘body in the brain’’ (Berlucchi and
Aglioti 1997) or ‘‘body schema’’ is a highly ﬂexible
central representation of the human body. More gener-
ally, research with amputees has reminded us that ‘‘[w]e
stand to learn most from phantoms if we attend closely
to patients’ subjective reports’’ (Halligan et al. 1999, p.
587). Indeed, the quantity and quality of cortical reor-
ganization can be critically related to detailed charac-
teristics of an individual’s phantom limb experience
(Flor et al. 1998; Knecht et al. 1998).
In striking contrast to the rapid pace with which our
understanding of the perceptual and neural correlates of
limb amputation unfolds stands the near absence of
experimental investigations of phantom limb phenom-
ena in persons with limb aplasia. This may be due to the
fact that many authors still doubt the very existence of
‘‘congenital phantoms’’ (Skoyles 1990; Flor et al. 1998).
Indeed, the implicit assumption that phantom sensations
of congenitally absent limbs cannot exist has occasion-
ally resulted in an embarrassing failure to ask aplasic
subjects about such sensations (Nico et al. 2004).
Nonetheless, in the clinical literature, phantoms of
congenitally absent limbs have been documented for
well over a century (Valentin 1836; Poeck 1964; Bur-
chard 1965; Grouios 1996). Relevant overview articles
indicate that approximately 10% (Boonstra et al. 2000)
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to 20% (Weinstein et al. 1964; Melzack et al. 1997) of
individuals born without limbs experience phantoms of
their missing limbs. Apart from the high incidence
of pain in post-amputation phantoms, which contrasts
with a virtual absence of painful congenital phantoms
(Melzack et al. 1997), the phenomenologies of the two
types of phantoms are comparable. In both cases,
postural and movement sensations predominate (Poeck
1969; Melzack et al. 1997) while thermal sensations are
rare (Lacroix et al. 1992). Importantly, visual inspection
of other peoples’ bodies can trigger phantom sensations
in amputees (Henderson and Smyth 1948) and people
with limb aplasia (Melzack et al. 1997). For example,
Melzack and colleagues (1997) reported the case of a 14-
year-old boy with a missing right forearm and hand,
whose phantom hand percept could be elicited by
‘‘playing with his friends and looking at their arms’’ (p.
1610).
These cross-modal interactions between the visual
observation of other people’s bodies and the ob-
server’s own body schema form the topic of the
present report. Some authors (see especially Melzack
1990) have taken the very existence of phantom sen-
sations of limbs that have never physically developed
as unshakable evidence for innate components of body
schema. The ultimate utility of such conclusions may
depend upon how one deﬁnes the term ‘‘body sche-
ma’’. Growing evidence from behavioral (Reed and
Farah 1995; Sebanz et al. 2003) and neuroimaging
(Gre`zes and Decety 2001) studies suggests that repre-
sentations of one’s own bodily actions share a com-
mon neural substrate with visual representations of the
actions performed by other people. Such ﬁndings
suggest that the ‘‘body schema’’ may be best under-
stood as a multimodal representation of one’s own
body that contains input from somatosensory, pro-
prioceptive, and vestibular systems as well as visual
information about human body dynamics.
Here we investigate the perceptual, speciﬁcally visual,
experiences of two people with bilateral congenital ab-
sence of arms during the presentation of other peoples’
upper limb movements. The rareness of bilateral arm
aplasia, especially when accompanied with phantom
sensations, precluded investigation of a larger group of
subjects. We used a paradigm introduced by Shiﬀrar and
Freyd (1990) in which observers watch pairs of photo-
graphs depicting a human model performing simple
actions. The two photographs diﬀer only in the position
of one limb segment relative to a joint, and their rapid
alternation gives rise to an apparent motion percept. As
long as the two photographs are ﬂashed in rapid suc-
cession, normal observers invariably perceive the dis-
placed limb traversing the shortest possible path of
visual apparent motion. Execution of a limb movement
along this seen trajectory is, however, not anatomically
possible, as it would violate natural joint constraints.
However, as the presentation rate slows, observers
increasingly perceive paths of apparent limb movement
that follow natural human limb trajectories (Shiﬀrar and
Freyd 1990, 1993). Apparently, stored kinesthetic
knowledge about possible movements constrains the
visual perception of human movement provided ample
processing time is provided for cross-modal sensorimo-
tor–visual interaction. In line with this interpretation,
neuroimaging data have revealed motor and parietal
cortex involvement at slow, but not rapid, presentation
rates (Stevens et al. 2000). This psychophysical para-
digm seemed ideally suited to quantitatively investigat-
ing interactions between phantom limb sensation and
limb movement observation.
Two persons with limb aplasia were tested. While
both are highly comparable in physical appearance and
intelligence, they diﬀer crucially in their experiences of
their missing limbs. One participant reports vivid
phantom sensations of missing arms and hands (Brugger
et al. 2000), while the other has never experienced any
phantom sensations whatsoever. If the experience of
phantom limbs by individuals born without those limbs
reﬂects visually-based modiﬁcations of the body schema,
and if visual perception of other people’s actions de-
pends upon the observer’s own body schema, then one
would expect to ﬁnd that the two participants in the
current study diﬀer in their visual perceptions of other
people’s actions. Speciﬁcally, one would predict that the
individual who experiences phantoms of congenitally-
missing arms would exhibit normal, rate-dependent
percepts of apparent arm movement, while the individ-
ual who does not experience arm phantoms would not.
Materials and methods
Participants
Participant one, AZ, is a 46-year-old woman born
without legs and with two short upper arms without
elbow joints. Since her early youth, AZ has experienced
phantom sensations of her missing body parts that in-
clude both voluntary and involuntary movements of her
phantom arms. Her phantom reﬂex movements occa-
sionally follow anatomically impossible trajectories.
These occur, for instance, when reaching for a handrail
in a tramcar that abruptly stops. In this case, her
phantom hand is experienced ‘‘at the place of action’’,
that is, where her upper arm stump actually touches the
handrail. Intentionally induced hand and arm move-
ments are always experienced as part of the anatomically
possible repertoire of intact upper limbs. In a previous
study, voluntary movement of AZ’s phantom ﬁngers
activated premotor and parietal cortex, with the greatest
activation in the contralateral hemisphere (Brugger et al.
2000). As for interactions between feeling and seeing a
limb, we note that it has occurred to AZ that contem-
plation of her mirror image abolishes her phantom
sensations. AZ’s vision is normal. She holds a university
degree and works as a consultant for handicapped
individuals. The etiology of her limb deﬁciencies is
unknown.
342
Participant two, CL, is a 43-year-old man born with
shortened legs and absent arms (no shoulder articula-
tions). In daily life, he uses his right foot for writing,
eating, pointing, and gesturing. CL has not suﬀered any
visual or cognitive impairments in the course of the
thalidomide-related embryopathy. The skilful use of his
right foot enabled him to have a successful career as a
journalist. Importantly, CL has never experienced any
phantom sensations of his missing limbs.
We also tested six normally-limbed control observers
(‘‘intact observers’’) who were carefully matched by age
and education to AZ and CL, respectively. All eight
subjects gave written informed consent to participate in
the experiment, which was performed in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli and procedure
The stimulus set was similar to that used by Shiﬀrar and
Freyd (1990). Six stimulus pairs, each consisting of two
black and white photographs, were used. The picture
pairs depicted the start and end positions of the fol-
lowing arm and hand actions: (1) a man rotating his
right hand about his wrist (Fig. 1A); (2) the same for a
woman’s left hand; (3) the front view of a man rotating
his left forearm about his elbow such that his hand is
seen at the 11-o’clock and 8-o’clock positions; (4) the
same for a woman’s right forearm; (5) the side view of a
man rotating his left arm backwards about his shoulder
with the hands shown at the 2-o’clock and 4-o’clock
positions, and; (6) the same for a woman’s right arm.
Stimuli were presented in the center of a computer
screen (software MacProbe; Hunt 1994) and subtended
approximately 15 of visual angle both horizontally and
vertically from the participants’ viewing position. On
each trial, the two photographs of each stimulus pair
were presented for 90 ms each and separated by one of
four inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs): 135, 435, 735, and
1,035 ms. These ISIs were selected because they yielded
the most consistent apparent motion percepts in pilot
studies with healthy volunteers. Each stimulus pair was
presented four times, once with each ISI. For each
participant, the sequences of stimulus pairs and ISIs
were pseudo-randomized across trials. Each trial con-
sisted of 12 cycles of alternation between the two pho-
tographs. Immediately following each trial, the
participants indicated their perceived path of apparent
motion on a response sheet (Fig. 1B). As in Shiﬀrar and
Freyd (1990, 1993), two possible paths of apparent
motion were depicted on the response sheet. The short,
physically impossible path was always labeled ‘‘A’’. The
longer, physically possible path was labeled ‘‘B’’. Al-
though two additional response options included the
possibility of seeing ‘‘both A and B’’ paths and ‘‘neither
A nor B’’ paths, participants were encouraged to pri-
marily decide between options A and B.
Results
For each of the eight volunteers, the percentages of trials
during which they reported perceiving the short,
impossible ‘‘A’’ path of apparent motion and the long,
possible ‘‘B’’ path of apparent motion were determined
at each ISI. The proportion of short to long paths is
displayed in Fig. 2. The six intact observers perceived
the short, anatomically impossible paths of apparent
limb motion at the 135 and 435 ms ISIs. Conversely, at
the longer 735 and 1,035 ms ISIs, these same partici-
pants were more likely to perceive the longer, anatomi-
cally possible paths of apparent limb rotation.
Consistent with previous results (Shiﬀrar and Freyd
1990), all six intact observers produced this same pattern
of apparent motion perceptions. We calculated the slope
of the linear regression line for each of these subjects.
The boundaries of the respective 95% conﬁdence inter-
val were 0.219 and 0.132.
The two participants with limb aplasia, however, re-
ported divergent patterns of apparent motion percep-
tion. AZ’s perceived paths of apparent motion depended
upon ISI in the same manner as path perception de-
pended upon ISI for intact observers. AZ perceived the
short, anatomically impossible paths of apparent limb
motion at the 135 ms ISI and longer, anatomically
possible paths at 1,035 ISI. At the 735 ISI AZ favored
neither the anatomically possible nor the anatomically
impossible path. The slope of her linear regression was
Fig. 1 A A sample stimulus pair that normally produces an
apparent rotation of the hand rotating about the wrist at long
ISIs. The arrow indicates that the two photographs in each pair
were sequentially ﬂashed in rapid alternation (12 cycles with an
inter-stimulus interval of 135, 435, 735, or 1,035 ms). B Response
sheet (for the sample stimulus displayed in A) on which observers
indicated, after each trial, what option best described their percept
on that trial
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0.143 and thus lies within the intact observers’ conﬁ-
dence interval.
Conversely, CL consistently perceived the short,
anatomically impossible paths of apparent arm/hand
rotation at all ISIs. The slope of his linear regression was
0.008 and thus outside the conﬁdence interval of intact
observers.
We further calculated, for each ISI, the intact
observers’ 95% conﬁdence interval for the mean pro-
portion of short to long path percepts. AZ’s data lie
within the boundaries formed by these control partici-
pants’ responses, except at the ISI of 435 ms. In con-
trast, CL’s data lie outside these boundaries, except at
the ISI of 435 ms (Fig. 2).
The percentages of ‘‘A and B’’ and ‘‘Neither A nor
B’’ responses across all ISIs were 13.5% (SD=8.7%) for
the controls and 16.7 and 12.5% for participants AZ and
CL, respectively.
Discussion
Six intact observers showed the kinesthetically modu-
lated perceptions of apparent limb motion ﬁrst described
in Shiﬀrar and Freyd (1990). While rapid display rates,
or short ISIs, triggered the visual perception of short,
anatomically impossible trajectories, longer ISIs allowed
stored knowledge about natural joint mechanics to
constrain perceived paths of apparent limb motion. This
implicit biasing of what is seen by what is possible, given
the biomechanical limitations of the human body, was
also observed for AZ, but not for CL.
On ﬁrst consideration, the current results may appear
surprising since AZ was born without hands and fore-
arms and therefore has never executed any movements
with these body parts. Since her early youth, however,
she has experienced vivid phantom sensations of all
missing body parts, including individual ﬁngers.
Importantly, while AZ does not report the experience of
pain or temperature in her phantoms, she does report
highly vivid postural and movement sensations in them
(Brugger et al. 2000). Our previous quantiﬁcation of
AZ’s phantom movement sensations also involved a
limb laterality task based on Parsons (1994). In this task,
observers report whether a visually depicted hand or
foot comes from the right or left side of the body. Intact
observers showed longer reaction times whenever stimuli
diﬀered by larger physical rotations from their own
corresponding body parts. AZ’s data showed the same
pattern; namely, longer reaction times for stimuli
requiring a 180 rotation of her phantoms. These ﬁnd-
ings, together with those of the present experiment,
strongly suggest that years of phantom movement
experience may impose similar constraints on the visual
analysis of human body stimuli as do years of sensori-
motor experience with physically intact limbs. In addi-
tion, the current results indicate that, just like observers
with intact bodies, AZ’s visual processing is inﬂuenced
by kinesthetic body schema information.
The causality underlying this potential crossmodal
interaction between phantom limb sensation and the
visual analysis of body motion is unclear. One could
argue that AZ’s visual perception of human movement is
constrained by innate information about kinesthetic
properties of the human body (Melzack 1990; Melzack
et al. 1997). Alternatively, the proprioceptive or kines-
thetic components of the body schema per se need not be
innate. It is conceivable that somatic phantom sensa-
tions in people with congenital limb aplasia arise from
activations of a system matching action observation and
action execution (Gre`zes and Decety 2001; Rizzolatti
et al. 2001; Stevens et al. 2000). Anecdotal clinical
observation (Melzack et al. 1997) is in fact compatible
with the view that limb movement observation may be a
prerequisite for the development of limb movement
sensations. On the other hand, long-term limb obser-
vation alone cannot dictate the presence or absence of
phantom sensations. If it did, then all sighted persons
with limb aplasia would report such sensations. Thus,
what remains to be understood is why only a minority of
Fig. 2 Diﬀerence between
percentage of short (A in
Fig. 1B) and long (B in Fig. 1B)
paths of apparent motion
plotted as a function of inter-
stimulus interval. Data are
averaged over the six diﬀerent
stimulus pairs. Solid line shows
data from six intact observers
(mean ± 95% conﬁdence
intervals)
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people with limb aplasia experience congenital phan-
toms.
The ﬁnding that CL’s visual perception of apparent
limb movements is timing-independent emphasizes the
importance of each individual’s history of phantom
sensations (recall that CL has never experienced phan-
toms of his congenitally absent limbs). Interestingly,
CL’s timing-independent perception of apparent limb
rotations in the current task concurs with his absence of
a regular reaction time pattern in limb laterality tasks
(Funk 2001). However, these results do not help us to
identify the factors that determine whether or not a
person with limb aplasia will develop congenital phan-
toms. We are currently studying the functional neuro-
anatomy of AZ’s and CL’s action observation systems
to ﬁnd out whether the neural circuits known to be in-
volved in normally-limbed individuals (Buccino et al.
2001) are diﬀerently engaged in aplasic persons. It is
conceivable that limb observation triggers limb sensa-
tion only in those aplasic persons whose neural circuitry
allows for a rich integration of motor representations
and their visual counterparts. Recent work on premotor
cortex contributions to feelings of ownership for a
visually observed limb may be relevant here (Ehrsson
et al. 2004).
In summary, our preliminary data show that phan-
tom sensations of congenitally absent limbs can inﬂu-
ence the visual perception of other peoples’ bodies in
much the same way as does a lifelong use of physically
developed limbs. These results should be corroborated
in a larger sample of persons with limb aplasia, and
leave several pressing questions to be addressed. First,
are the performance diﬀerences described in the present
study reﬂected in activation diﬀerences, primarily of the
motor and parietal cortex, during limb movement
observation (Stevens et al. 2000)? Second, is the pres-
ence/absence of intact biological motion processing
accompanied by structural changes in areas of the motor
cortex? Such changes have been reported in some
(Gowers 1879; Stoeckel et al. 2005), but not other
(Hamzei et al. 2001) individuals with congenital limb
deﬁciencies. Lastly, how does the congenital absence of a
single arm constrain participants’ perceptions of hand
movement? This question is interesting independent of
participants’ histories of phantom sensations (see Funk
and Brugger 2002; Nico et al. 2004), and is especially
important with respect to traditional theories concerning
the origins of congenital phantoms (Valentin 1836;
Burchard 1965; Grouios 1996). These theories suggest
that, in unilateral amelia, phantom sensations of a
missing arm could arise from sensorimotor representa-
tions of its existing counterpart.
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